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“This is a Game”: A History of the Foreign 
Terrorist Organization and State Sponsors of 
Terrorism Lists and their Applications   
By Melissa Sanford 
 
Abstract: Following the post-September 11 United States 
reconfiguration of foreign policy, the use of the State Department’s 
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and State Sponsors of 
Terrorism (SST) lists and related news media coverage 
dramatically increased. Considering the gravity of such 
designations, both because of the potentially devastating economic 
ramifications in the form of sanctions and as negative P.R., it is 
imperative to examine the historical use and application of these 
lists. This paper seeks to help better determine the legitimacy of 
being designated on either of these lists through the analysis of two 
entities that have experienced listing: the Mujahedeen-e Khalq 
(MEK) and the country of Iraq. Examination of these two cases 
reveals the role of strategic relationships with the U.S. government 
in terrorism designations and exposes the reality that, in these 
particular instances, the FTO and SST have been wielded as 
mechanisms of U.S. foreign policy rather than applied as 
legitimate safeguards. In the context of current U.S.-Iran relations, 
and U.S. foreign policy as a whole, it is essential to better 
understand the validity of the U.S. State Department terrorism 
designation based on the history of the circumstances surrounding 





At the 2019 Munich Security Conference, a yearly forum held to 
discuss the world’s most urgent security issues, growing tensions 
 




between Iran and the United States, which resulted from the U.S’s 
unilateral pullout from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA), dominated much of the conversation. Iranian Foreign 
Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif made a statement to the 
conference wherein he pointed out the illegality of the United 
States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA, the U.S. role in increasing 
regional tensions and conflict, as well as the 40-year history of 
U.S. “demonization” of Iran. In the Q&A session following his 
speech, Zarif provided the example of the listing of Iran and the 
listing and delisting of Iraq and the MEK on the United States 
terrorism lists as central examples of the seemingly erratically 
applied terrorist designation: 
 
In 1984, the United States removed Saddam 
Hussein from its terrorism list and put Iran on it’s 
the (sic) terrorism list. Again, in the 1990s, Saddam 
was again on the terrorism list in 1998 the United 
States put (the) MEK on the terrorism list, in 2012 
they took them off the terrorism list. This is a game. 
This game needs to stop.1    
 
Considering the gravity of the terrorist designation as it 
undergirds the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the maximum 
pressure policy of the Trump administration, Zarif’s question 
regarding the logic of its application seems not only appropriate 
but arguably required. The listing and delisting of Iraq during and 
following the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), in which the United 
States provided military and intelligence support for Iraq, suggests 
that the designation may have indeed been used as an instrument of 
convenience. Additionally, the listing of Iran on the state sponsors 
of terrorism list in 1984 allowed for a simultaneous legitimization 
of sanctions applied to the country. Then, in 2013, the delisting of 
the MEK enabled the recognition and support of the opposition 
 







group which openly advocates for the end of the legitimate 
government of Iran. Both lists give the impression through their 
names and through depictions in U.S. news media that they are 
reserved for the identification and punishment of terrorist actions, 
but Zarif’s example provides potential evidence to the contrary. 
Indeed, the designation of terrorist, terrorist organization, or state 
sponsor of terrorism, is used regularly in foreign policy. It is used 
to imply legitimacy or provide rationale to the application of 
sanctions and cooperation, or in the case of the Trump 
administration and the JCPOA, non-cooperation with international 
law. Therefore, a historical examination of Foreign Minister 
Zarif’s response is not only warranted but necessary. Moreover, 
are the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization 
(FTO) and state sponsors of terrorism lists created to reflect actual 
terrorist threats or are they merely a foreign policy tool in a larger 
geo-political game played by the United States as posited by Zarif? 
In this paper, I will examine the history of these lists and their 
applications using the examples of Iran, Iraq, and the MEK as 
provided by Zarif’s response.  
To achieve these goals, this paper will analyze Iranian 
Foreign Minister Javad Zarif’s statements made at the Munich 
Security Conference in order to determine if the United States has 
used the label of “terrorism” as it pertains to the FTO and SST lists 
to further hegemonic ambitions, a charge levied by critics.2 To 
provide the necessary context for this analysis, the paper first 
addresses the creation and intended use of the U.S. State 
Department state sponsors of terrorism and Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTO) lists by identifying the legislation that created 
them, the history of their use, and the requirements for and the 
consequences of being listed and delisted by drawing from official 
State Department releases. The examples provided by Foreign 
Minister Zarif in Munich will then be individually pursued: the 
listing of Iraq as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979, its 1982 
 
2 Paul Pillar, “The Corruption of the Terrorist Group List,” LobeLog, April 15, 
2019, https://lobelog.com/the-corruption-of-the-terrorist-group-list/. 
 




removal, and participation in the Iran-Iraq War with United States 
support, the listing of Iran in 1983, and subsequent relisting of Iraq 
in 1990 with the invasion of Kuwait. As per Zarif’s statement, an 
examination of the history of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and 
its status on and off the FTO list will follow. Although, first, it is 




In January 2020, it appeared that open warfare between the United 
States and Iran was a very likely possibility. The January 4 
assassination of General Qasem Soleimani, the leader of Iran’s 
Qud’s Force branch of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps 
(IRGC), by the U.S. and the subsequent promises of Iranian 
retribution, acted as the most recent catalyst. Relations have cycled 
between cautiously optimistic and bitterly hostile since the 1979 
Iranian Revolution, the two nations are now experiencing an 
unprecedented era of antagonism and uncertainty. On May 18, 
2018, President Trump announced that the United States would be 
unilaterally withdrawing from the Iran nuclear agreement, known 
as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This 
agreement was signed in 2015 by Iran and the five permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council (the United 
States, France, the United Kingdom, China, and Russia) as well as 
Germany, known collectively as the P5 + 1. Widely considered to 
be a monumental achievement in international nonproliferation 
security architecture, the signing of the JCPOA had been described 
as an opportunity to “open the way to a new chapter in 
international relations” and “a sign of hope for the entire world.”3 
Having taken over two years of intense direct talks on top of 
twelve years of tension directly related to Iran’s development of 
civilian nuclear energy (which the United States contends had a 
 
3 Julian Borger, “Iran Nuclear Deal Reached in Vienna,” The Guardian 








nuclear weapons adjunct), the motivation for the negotiation of the 
JCPOA was to allow Iran to escape the numerous sanctions applied 
to their economy, which had cost Iran $160 billion in oil revenue 
alone between 2012 and 2016, while ensuring the country did not 
develop nuclear weapon capabilities. This goal was to be 
accomplished through enrichment limits, international inspections, 
and monitoring.4 When the JCPOA was signed in 2015, the mood 
between Iran and the United States was cautiously hopeful as the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which 
established the JCPOA as international law, called on all 
signatories to facilitate trade and commerce with Iran, which 
includes the United States.5 Such an arrangement was a major 
departure from the decades of sanctions and mutual vitriol since 
the Iranian Revolution in 1979. While Iran immediately and fully 
complied with all aspects of the agreement according to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran was not able to 
enjoy the benefits associated with the agreement as President 
Obama refused to fully remove sanctions against the country as 
stipulated by the JCPOA. The Obama administration cited Iran’s 
alleged “support for terrorism and violations of human rights” as 
justification for keeping certain sanctions in place.6 While this 
decision dampened the newfound tone of U.S.-Iran cooperation 
 
4  “Full Text of the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The Washington Post (WP Company), 
accessed April 12, 2020, 
https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-
nuclear-deal/1651/. It should be noted that Iran signed in the NPT in 1970 and 
the Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa barring and denouncing the development 
of nuclear weapons under Islamic law. 
5 The JCPOA introduced caps on uranium enrichment, stockpiling, and 
centrifuges in return for a gradual lifting of sanctions and the normalizing of 
Iran on the international stage. Members' Research Service, “U.S. 
Decertification of the Iran Nuclear Deal,” European Parliamentary Research 
Service Blog, October 20, 2017, https://epthinktank.eu/2017/10/20/us-
decertification-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/. 
6 “Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal,” National Archives and 
Records Administration (National Archives and Records Administration), 
accessed November 17, 2019, https://obamawhitehoU.S..e.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal). 
 




ushered in by the agreement, the potential for a new era of 
diplomacy did not fully come to an end until the unilateral 
withdrawal of the United States under the following presidential 
administration.  
While on the campaign trail, then-presidential candidate 
Donald Trump regularly derided the still-landmark agreement and 
referred to it as “the worst deal ever.”7 Following Trump’s election 
in 2016, the incoming administration’s first National Security 
Advisor, Michael Flynn, made the vague threat of “officially 
putting Iran on notice” for their “support for terrorism,” among 
other alleged grievances. Verbal threats and accusations turned to 
policy implementation after continual changes in the new 
administration’s key foreign policy positions ultimately saw the 
appointment of neoconservative hawks and Iran hardliners, 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor 
John Bolton. With these two long-time Iran critics and open 
advocates of “regime change” now at the helm of U.S. Middle East 
foreign policy, the relationship between the two nations managed 
to deteriorate further.8 In declaring the unilateral withdrawal of the 
United States from the JCPOA in May 2018, President Trump 
called the agreement “decaying and rotten structure … defective at 
its core” and cited Iran’s alleged support for terrorism, calling the 
country “the leading sponsor of terror.”9 With the United States’ 
 
7 F. Brinley Bruton, “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?” NBCNews.com 
(NBCUniversal News Group, May 10, 2018), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/smart-facts/what-iran-nuclear-deal-
n868346. 
8 “Regime change” is a term used to describe a goal of foreign policy that is 
aimed at removing an existing governing body and replacing it with an 
ostensibly more (open/cooperative) one. The United States has employed this 
policy at various points throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, i.e.  
9 “Donald Trump Says U.S. Will Leave ‘Decaying, Rotten’ Iran Nuclear Deal,” 
South China Morning Post, May 9, 2018, 
https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/2145246/trump-
tells-frances-macron-us-will-withdraw-iran) It is important to note that President 
Trump made this decision despite the strong opposition of military advisors and 
several members of his own administration as well as European leaders of other 






withdrawal from the agreement, so too came the reinstatement of 
extraterritorial sanctions, meaning the application of sanctions on 
other countries doing business with Iran. This began the Trump 
administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign. As part of this 
campaign, Mike Pompeo laid out a twelve-point list of demands 
from Iran as conditions that need to be met to enter into a new 
nuclear deal with the United States. The twelve-points included 
extremely restrictive foreign policy, military, and nuclear power 
demands of the country while citing Iran’s alleged terror support: 
“providing the IAEA with unqualified access to all sites in the 
entire country, end its proliferation of ballistic missiles,” “end 
support to Middle East “terrorist” groups,” and “end the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard corps-linked Quds Force’s support for 
“terrorist” and “militant” partners around the world.”10 Other 
elements of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure 
campaign have included a military build-up in the Persian Gulf and 
listing the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization, which is the first time a nation’s military 
has been added to the U.S. State Department list.  
The withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA was 
largely met with global condemnation and considerable diplomatic 
efforts from the remaining signatories (China, Russia, and the 
“E3/EU-3” France, Britain, and Germany) to save the deal by 
continuing to uphold their commitments. The official Iranian 
policy following the U.S. withdrawal was one of “strategic 
patience” which called on Iran to maintain its original 
commitments for one year to allow the United States to rejoin the 
agreement and other signatories to uphold their commitments. As 
of May 2019, one year post-U.S. withdrawal from the deal, with no 
 
Long Scorned,” The New York Times (The New York Times, May 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-
deal.html. 
10 “President Donald J. Trump’s New Strategy on Iran,” The White House (The 








sanctions relief from the United States in sight and no action taken 
by the E3 signatories to ameliorate Iran’s economic condition, Iran 
began to scale back its commitments as allowed by articles 26 and 
36 of the JCPOA, which function as a failsafe for the signatories 
should the other parties not uphold their responsibilities as required 
by international law.11 Part of the effort to mitigate the fallout of 
the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA has been a massive 
diplomatic campaign. Chief in this undertaking has been Iranian 
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, an original architect of 
the JCPOA and Iran’s top diplomat, who has met with world 
leaders to call on signatories to uphold their commitments and urge 
the United States to rejoin the agreement.  
 
Foreign Terrorist Organization List (FTO) and State Sponsors 
of Terrorism (SST) 
 
The state sponsors of terrorism (SST)12 list, as described by the 
U.S. State Department is a list of countries that “have repeatedly 
provided support of international terrorism” and has been in 
perpetual use since its creation in 1979 under the Export 
Administration Act of 1979.13 The original list included Libya, 
 
11 “Full Text of the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The Washington Post (WP Company), 
accessed November 17, 2019, 
https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-
nuclear-deal/1651/. 
12 For the purposes of this paper, the acronym SST will be used when discussing 
the U.S. State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism. This acronym is not 
utilized in official documents.  
13 “State Sponsors of Terrorism - United States Department of State,” U.S. 
Department of State (U.S. Department of State), accessed November 17, 2019, 
https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/) Note that the EAA’79 has 
been in a state of flux since its inception (including being repealed nearly in its 
entirety and essentially replaced with the Export Controls Act of 2018). Since 
2001 sections of the EAA’79 have been renewed by executive order under the 
International Emergency Powers Act.  
 “State Sponsors of Terrorism - United States Department of State,” U.S. 







Iraq, South Yemen, and Syria. The U.S. Secretary of State is given 
jurisdiction to determine if a country in question has “repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated 
pursuant to three laws: section1254(c) of the Export Controls Act 
of 2018 (ECA), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA), and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act 
(FAA).”14 There are currently four countries listed as state 
sponsors by the U.S. State Department: Syria, Iran, Sudan, and 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea).15 Only Iraq 
and North Korea have experienced periods off the list only to be 
relisted at a later time, the circumstances of which will be 
examined in more detail below. 
The ECA, FAA, and the AECA not only form the legal 
basis for state sponsor of terrorism designation but also provide the 
conditions for delisting and allowances for presidential waivers. 
There are two possible pathways afforded by the three statues that 
allow for a country to be removed from the U.S. State 
Department’s SST list. The first stipulates that the President 
reports and certifies to congress that “(i) there has been a 
fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the 
government of the country concerned; (ii) that government is not 
supporting acts of international terrorism; and (iii) that government 
has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international 
terrorism in the future.”16 The second potential pathway is a 
certification to Congress 45 days prior to the proposed rescission 
that the government in question has not “provided any support for 
acts of international terrorism during the preceding 6-month 
period” and has assured that it will not in the future.17 The first 
 
14 “State Sponsors of Terrorism - United States Department of State.” 
15 Syria (listed: 12/29/1979), Iran (1/19/1984), Sudan (8/12/1993) and 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) (1988, relisted 
11/20/2017).  
16 Dianne E. Rennack, “State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism -- 
Legislative Parameters: in Brief,” State sponsors of acts of international 
terrorism -- legislative parameters: in brief § (n.d.), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/. 
17 Rennack, “State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism.”  
 




option necessitates that the president inform a larger body of 
officials, including the House and Senate Committee on Foreign 
Affairs as stipulated by the ECA, whereas the FAA and AECA 
require reporting to only the Speaker of the House and the Foreign 
Relations Committee Chairperson.18 Congress is afforded the 
power through the AECA to block the delisting of a country 
through enacting a joint resolution during the 45-day period prior 
to rescission.19 In addition, each of the three statutes provides the 
President the authority to utilize waivers. These waivers allow the 
President to waive restrictions outlined in the three statutes that 
undergird the designation of state sponsor of terrorism. For 
instance, the President may use this waiver authority if they 
determine the transaction would be “essential to the national 
security interest of the United States.”20 Similarly, Congress can 
circumvent restrictions through the implementation of the language 
“notwithstanding any other provision of law” to annual 
appropriations.21 Therefore, both the Executive and Legislative 
branches have the ability to exercise their own prerogative to 
overlook the provisions laid out by the ECA, FAA, and AECA. In 
other words, countries may be removed from the “terrorist lists” 
for reasons having nothing to do with terrorism.  
 While the SST list applies to the state level, the U.S. State 
Department can target substate actors through the designation of 
Foreign Terrorist Organization. The Foreign Terrorist Organization 
(FTO) list was created from the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which was an amendment of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, section 219.22 This amendment 
authorizes the Secretary of State to designate a group as a “foreign 




20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Congressional Research Service, The “FTO List” and Congress: Sanctioning 







three conditions, as defined by title 8 section 1189 of the United 
States Code, must be met: 
 
1. It must be a foreign organization. 
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined 
in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) 
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 
1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the 
capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or 
terrorism. 
3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must 
threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national 
security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic 
interests) of the United States.23 
 
This determination is ultimately that of the Secretary of State and 
he or she may add an organization to the list at any time.24 
Designations last for two years and are then subject to review and 
must be renewed for an organization to remain listed. Following 
the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks, the act was 
amended through the U.S. Patriot Act, thereby increasing the scope 
of the designation to include “organizations engaged in terrorism 
and organizations retaining the capability and intent to engage in 
terrorist activity or terrorism” and allows for perpetual re-
designations of an organization.25 Once on the list, an organization 
 
23 “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, accessed 
February 9, 2019, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
24 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “The ‘FTO List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” The “FTO list” and Congress: sanctioning 
designated foreign terrorist organizations § (2003), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/. The determination to make a designation is 
made in cooperation with interagency intelligence.  
25 Eric Bronxmeyer, “The Problems of Security and Freedom: Procedural Due 
Process and the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations under the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,” Berkeley Journal of International 
 




designation, as per section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA), may be revoked “at any time…if the Secretary finds 
that – (i) the circumstances that were the basis for the designation 
have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation; or (ii) the 
national security of the United States warrants a revocation.”26 
This allows for the Secretary of State to delist any organization at 
any time for reasons that may or may not have to do with 
terrorism, as Section 1189 defines “national security” as “the 
national defense, foreign relations or economic interests of the 
United States.”27  
Organizations and states that are listed on either the SST or 
FTO are subject to a number of legal ramifications. Designation as 
a state sponsor of terrorism results in the issuing of economic 
sanctions, which include “restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a 
ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls of dual use 
items; and miscellaneous financial restrictions.”28 As noted above, 
there are allowances for Presidential waivers to be made, as well as 
language that Congress can implement to sidestep these 
restrictions. Importantly, sanctions are not limited to the designated 
country but can be extended to other countries that engage with 
designated state sponsors. For the FTO, as per Section 1189, these 
restrictions extend to “a person in the United States or subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide ‘material 
support or resources’”29 and is barred admission to the United 
 
Law 22, no. 3 (2004): pp. 439-488, https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38M63R, p.441, 
443. 
26 [US C02] 8 USC Ch. 12: IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY, accessed 
November 18, 2019, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-
prelim-title8-chapter12&edition=prelim. 
27 Ibid. 
28“State Sponsors of Terrorism - United States Department of State,” U.S. 
Department of State (U.S. Department of State), accessed November 17, 2019, 
https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/. Dual use goods are 
technology and software that have both civilian and military applications.  
29 Examples of material support or resources include property, currency, 
services, training, weapons, personnel, transportation, and expert advice or 






States.30 Additionally, any assets of the organization may be frozen 
and all financial transactions blocked.31 Regarding goals and 
intended effects of these ramifications, the U.S. State Department 
website explains, “FTO designations play a critical role in our fight 
against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support 
for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the 
terrorism business.”32  
In addition to the FTO and State Sponsor lists, Executive 
Order 13224, which was signed two weeks following the 
September 11 attacks, gives the Secretary of State and the Treasury 
authority to designate foreign individuals or entities as Specially 
Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).33 These individuals or 
entities are determined to “have committed, or pose a significant 
risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of 
U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy 
of the United States.”34 On July 31, 2019, this designation had 
been extended to  Mohammad Javad Zarif, blocking any property 
or finances he may have in the United States and severely limiting 
 
Organizations - United States Department of State,” U.S. Department of State 
(U.S. Department of State), accessed November 18, 2019, 
https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/). 
30 “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, accessed 
February 9, 2019, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
31 [USC02] 8 USC Ch. 12: IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY, accessed 
November 18, 2019, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-
prelim-title8-chapter12&edition=prelim, sec c. 
32 “Terrorist Designations and State Sponsors of Terrorism - United States 
Department of State,” U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State), 
accessed November 18, 2019, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designations-and-
state-sponsors-of-terrorism/#state. 
33 “Terrorist Designations and State Sponsors of Terrorism - United States 
Department of State,” U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State), 
accessed November 18, 2019, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designations-and-
state-sponsors-of-terrorism/#state. 
34 “Terrorism Designations FAQs - United States Department of State,” U.S. 
Department of State (U.S. Department of State), accessed November 18, 2019, 
https://www.state.gov/terrorism-designations-faqs/. 
 




his ability to travel to the U.S.35 Bearing this in mind, let us return 
to parse Zarif’s statement from the Munich Security Conference.  
 
In 1984, the United States removed Saddam 
Hussein from its terrorism list and put Iran on its the 
(sic) terrorism list. Again, in the 1990s, Saddam 
was again on the terrorism list… 
 
Iraq was among the original countries listed as a state 
sponsor of terrorism (SST) when the list was created in 1979. Its 
support for the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK), Kurdistan Workers 
Party, Abu Nidal (ANO), the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO), and other Palestinian groups, are cited as the primary 
motivation for including Iraq on the original list.36  This listing was 
but one more step in the increasingly strained diplomatic relations 
between the U.S. and Iraq. Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, 
Iraq ended diplomatic relations with the United States because of 
U.S. support for Israel during the war. In the years that followed, 
Iraq and the Soviet Union forged closer ties, which included Soviet 
access to Iraqi naval and air bases and Soviet furnishing of arms to 
Iraq. With the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the establishment of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United States was faced with a 
new reality which necessitated a new strategic approach in the 
Middle East. The pursuit to build a new alliance resulted in 
renewed diplomatic ties with Iraq as evidenced by the 1983 
delisting as an SST, military and intelligence support during the 
Iran-Iraq War, and facilitating the use of chemical weapons, a 
 
35 “U.S. Department of the Treasury,” Treasury Designates Iran's Foreign 
Minister Javad Zarif for Acting for the Supreme Leader of Iran, October 22, 
2019, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm749. 
36 Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built 






violation of international humanitarian law as reflected in the 
Geneva Conventions.37   
Though exact numbers remain uncertain, it is estimated that 
there were more than one and a half million casualties that resulted 
from the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).38 The origins of this brutal 
eight-year conflict lay in disagreements concerning the 1975 
Algiers Agreement, which was an endeavor to alleviate issues that 
fostered tensions in the years prior and in the fundamental 
differences in worldview between Saddam Hussein’s secular 
nationalist Ba’ath Party and Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary 
universalist Shia Islam. The Iran-Iraq War was intended to be a 
short military operation as Saddam counted on post-revolutionary 
Iran to be in disarray, thereby allowing for an easy victory. Instead, 
Saddam’s forces were met with considerable strength. Ultimately, 
the war came to its close with the signing of a UN-sponsored 
cease-fire on August 20, 1988.39 The eight years of war changed 
nothing in terms of territorial borders and only served to strengthen 
the morale of the Islamic Republic, both of which were in 
opposition to Saddam’s intended goals, as well as those of the 
United States.  
One element illuminated by this conflict was the 
willingness for the United States to supply Iraq, in the form of 
arms and intelligence, in the hopes of gaining a regional ally, 
preventing Soviet influence, and weakening the Islamic Republic, 
all of which were facilitated by and motivations for the delisting of 
Iraq as a SST. The desire for a new ally was born out of the 
strategic loss of Iran in 1978. Prior to the revolution, Iran was the 
most valuable and most cultivated ally in the region and, along 
with Saudi Arabia, was considered one of the “Twin Pillars” of 
 
37 For an extensive archive of declassified documents detailing this U.S. role in 
supporting the Saddam Hussein regime during the 1980s see “Shaking Hands 
with Saddam” (GW National Security Archive). 
38 Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 
2002). 
39 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle 
East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016), 444. 
 




U.S. Middle Eastern policy. The establishment of this relationship 
is detailed by Mark Gasiorowski, who examines the nature of the 
U.S.-Iran client-patron relationship. A client-patron, or client, 
relationship is one in which a patron country trades economic aid 
and security assistance to a smaller client country. In return for this 
aid, the client country acts as a regional policeman and provides 
joint military and intelligence operations, as well as allowing the 
placement of military bases.40 From the 1953 U.S.-backed coup, in 
which the CIA and MI6 successfully unseated Iranian Prime 
Minister Mossadegh, to the end of the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1978, 
the United States supplied Iran with economic and security aid in 
return for “regional stability.” Importantly, this client-patron 
relationship was instrumental in bringing about the Islamic 
Revolution.41 As a result of the Islamic Revolution, the United 
States lost the central pillar that made up the basis of the Twin 
Pillars strategy. The United States then looked to Iraq to take Iran’s 
place. 
  At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, the United States 
hoped for the two countries to weaken each other with essentially 
no victor (as evidenced in “allowing” Israel to supply Iran with 
arms (Iran-Contra).42 But by 1982, it was evident that Iran was 
more likely to prove successful in the conflict and thus U.S. 
support for Iraq became more overt. By delisting Iraq from the 
State Sponsors of Terrorism, the United States was able to 
legitimize U.S. support of Iraq through supplies, both economic 
and military, and to better facilitate a friendly relationship between 
the countries. Indeed, the desire to create such a relationship can be 
 
40 Mark J Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1991). 
41 Gasiorowski explains that U.S. support for the Shah of Iran created a highly 
autonomous state (meaning the state does not derive its power from the people 
of the country therefore it does not act accordingly in their interests) thereby 
facilitating the conditions which gave rise to the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  
42 Iran Contra scandal in which the United States provided arms in return for 
hostage negotiations (Hostage Crisis), facilitated by Israel and used profits to 







seen  immediately following the Iranian Revolution, as evidenced 
by comments made by the Carter administration’s National 
Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, when he encouraged the 
United States to “compensate for the loss of its Iranian pillar by 
tilting toward Iraq” and argued that “we see no fundamental 
incompatibility of interests between the United States and Iraq. We 
do not feel that American Iraqi relations need to be frozen in 
antagonism.”43 While the United States did desire a new ally, the 
beginning of support for Iraq was more to do with preventing a 
clear victory. Had Iraq lost its war against Iran, Middle Eastern 
dynamics concerning the United States, its allies, and the region’s 
oil production would have completely changed. It was therefore 
argued that overt support for Iraq to prevent such a situation was 
necessary.  
The solidification of U.S. support for Iraq came with the 
removal of the country from the SST list, though support was 
provided even prior to its removal. In a 1992 New York Times 
article, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh reported on 
evidence that the United States had been covertly supplying Iraq 
since at least 1982. Hersh describes how this support was in direct 
opposition to the publicized Reagan administration stance of 
neutrality on the Iran-Iraq War. The support provided to Iraq prior 
to its delisting closely resembles the forms of support provided 
later, taking on the form of intelligence sharing and the sale of 
American-made arms.44 Hersh provides a quote from a U.S. State 
official which succinctly describes the position of the United 
States’ support for Iraq, “it was agreed that the public policy of the 
Administration, to remain even-handed, was not in the national 
interest [but it was] decided that it was not in the national interest 
 
43 Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built 
Saddam’s War Machine (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1997), 32. 
44 Seymour Hersh, “U.S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War Against 








to publicly announce a change in the policy.”45 By 1984, the 
United States was prepared to begin backing Iraq more directly, 
although it appears that the shift from a public appearance of 
neutrality to an overt backing still remained quiet. For example, the 
New York Times reported that “apparently without consulting 
Congress, the Administration has quietly dropped Iraq…from a list 
of countries barred from receiving American weapons because 
they ‘have repeatedly supported act of international terrorism.’”46 
The move to delist Iraq opened the door for the United States to 
provide even more economic and military aid.  
The delisting of Iraq from the State Department list of 
nations sponsoring terrorism in 1983, under the Reagan 
administration, helped legitimize U.S. support for Iraq, in the form 
of supplying intelligence and arms and dual use technology sales, 
despite the fact that the United States was already providing prior 
support. By removing Iraq from the list, export controls were 
loosened, and an intelligence-sharing initiative was further 
fostered.47 With Iraq off the list, the U.S. was now eligible to 
provide financed export credits and direct sales of military and 
dual-use technology. As the war progressed, it became more 
apparent that the conflict would not result in an easy defeat of Iran, 
U.S. support for Iraq became increasingly more direct and came at 
a great price.48  
 
45 Seymour Hersh, “U.S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War Against 
Iran,” The New York Times, January 26, 1992, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/26/world/us-secretly-gave-aid-to-iraq-early-
in-its-war-against-iran.html. 
46 Milt Freudenheim et al., “The World in Summary: Readjustments in the 
Mideast,” The New York Times, February 28, 1982. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/28/weekinreview/the-world-in-summary-
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48 Another example of the great cost at which U.S. support for Iraq came are the 
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Perhaps the best example of U.S. support of Iraq, and the 
profound cost at which it came, was the attempt to conceal the 
furnishing of helicopters used to deploy illegal chemical weapons. 
Immediately following the removal of Iraq from the state sponsors 
of terrorism list, the Reagan administration sold Iraq Hughes MD-
500 Defender helicopters and Bell UH-1 helicopters.49 Though it 
was argued that these helicopters were specifically used for 
civilian purposes, these crafts can be easily weaponized for 
military purposes in a very short period of time. Former National 
Security Council official Howard Teicher admitted that the UH-1 
helicopter “could be easily modified by the Iraqis to carry machine 
guns and transport troops.”50 The stated reason for the need for 
such helicopters was that they were required to spray crops, but it 
has since been argued that they were used to deploy chemical 
weapon attacks.51 The Reagan administration was aware of 
Saddam’s use of chemical weapons as Iran had been reporting the 
use of chemical warfare to the United Nations well before asking 
for a formal investigation in 1983. In a declassified 1983 State 
Department briefing on “Iraqi Illegal Use of Chemical Weapons 
(CW),” it was concluded that “Iraq had used domestically-
produced lethal CW in its war with Iran. [redacted]. Such use 
violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol.”52 The briefing goes on to state 
that “Iraqi CW capability was developed in part through the 
unwitting and, in some cases, we believe with the assistance of a 
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49 Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built 
Saddam’s War Machine (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1997), 37. 
50 Ibid., 38. 
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CounterPunch.org, April 1, 2015, 
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number of Western firms.”53 On March 2, 1988, Iraq underwent its 
most extensive use of chemical weapons on the civilian Iraqi 
Kurdish population of Halabja, in which 5,000 people were 
killed.54 The lethal nerve agents sarin, mustard gas, and VX were 
dropped on the city’s population.55  Prior to the tragedy at Halabja, 
Iran had brought before the UN Security Council the issue of Iraq 
utilizing chemical weapons, including in 1984 when Iran brought 
before the UNSC the claim that CW had been used on 49 
occasions, killing 12,000 and wounding 5,000 between 1981 and 
1984.56 Each time, the United States either utilized its veto power 
to prevent the cases from being heard or paid very little attention to 
the claims.57   
The United States continued to support Iraq after the cease-
fire that brought the Iran-Iraq War to an end on August 20, 1988. It 
would not be until the Iraqi invasion of neighboring U.S. ally 
Kuwait on August 2, 1990 that the U.S. again designated the 
country as a state sponsor of terrorism. Iraq was placed back on the 
SST list the following September, just weeks after the invasion, as 
the United States, under the George H.W. Bush administration, 
decided to intervene by leading Operation Desert Shield and 
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Storm.58 It is important to note that the support of the United States 
during and after the Iran-Iraq War led directly to the invasion of 
Kuwait, as Saddam felt that the U.S. would continue to back the 
country.59 The following years saw the enforcement of crippling 
sanctions on Iraq under the Clinton administration.60 Ultimately, 
Iraq was delisted again in 2004 following the 2003 U.S. invasion 
and the end of the Saddam regime. It is important to note that 
neither the delisting of Iraq in 1983 nor the relisting in 1990 had to 
do with the country supporting terrorism. 
Shortly following Iraq’s delisting in late 1983, Iran was 
designated as an SST on January 19, 1984 where it remains to this 
day. In addition to the listing of Iran, so too came the 
implementation of Operation Staunch, which first launched in the 
Spring of 1983, which aimed to restrict arms to Iran.61 Iran’s 
position on the list has helped provide U.S. presidential 
administrations with justification for maintaining sanctions on the 
country in the subsequent decades. Indeed, President Obama cited 
this for maintaining certain sanctions post signing of the JCPOA in 
2015.  
Having explored the example of the circumstances 
surrounding the SST designation of Iran and Iraq, let us return to 
Zarif’s quote: “...1998 the United States put [the] MEK on the 
terrorism list, in 2012 they took them off the terrorism list.” 
One of the opposition groups born out of the violent 
repression of dissident voices in the early 1960s under Shah 
 
58 Operation Staunch was a worldwide campaign led by the United States to 
prevent the sale of arms to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. This Operation was 
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Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and the CIA/MOSSAD-trained state 
secret police force, SAVAK, was the Mujahedeen-e Khalq 
(MEK).62 The MEK partook in guerilla activities along with other 
groups that formed during this time of repression.63 These 
activities included a number of bombings, assassinations, and the 
attempted kidnapping of members of the royal family and U.S. 
personnel stationed in Iran.64 Despite the Shah’s violent repression, 
the MEK and related groups remained active underground, later 
reemerging in the lead up to and during the revolution. Following 
the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the MEK were denounced and exiled 
by Ayatollah Khomeini after the group sought to overthrow the 
new regime following disputes over the constitutional referendum. 
The organization then began a terror campaign in which 70 high 
ranking Iranian officials were killed through the bombing of the 
Prime Minister’s and Islamic Republic Party offices in 1981.65 
These attacks then, in turn, resulted in targeting of the MEK by the 
new Iranian government and its supporters. As a result, MEK 
leadership, including the group’s leader Masoud Rajavi, fled to 
France. Following their expulsion from that country in 1981, they 
then established themselves in Iraq, where their military wing 
joined Saddam Hussein’s forces in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War 
and supported the suppression of Shiites and Kurds during the first 
Gulf War.66 Additionally, the MEK have undertaken terror 
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activities during the 1990s and early 2000s, targeting Iranian 
civilians and leadership. These included attacks on Iranian 
embassies and consular missions in thirteen countries, a bombing 
and mortar attack in Iran that killed fifteen people, attacks on the 
offices of the Supreme Leader and President, and the assassination 
of the deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces Brigadier General, 
Ali Sayyaad Shirazi.67  
Since the MEK’s falling out with the Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Khomeini, the group has maintained a steadfast goal of 
overthrowing Iran’s government. A U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation report on criminal investigations of the organization 
in 2004 describes this goal as “a romantic view of a utopian society 
in Iran run by the MEK. They have even set up a government made 
up of NLA and NCR members that will assume power when they, 
in their minds, ultimately, take control of Iran.”68 Indeed, the 
organization has “voted” Maryam Rajavi as president-in-exile with 
the intention of her assuming this role once the proposed 
overthrow takes place. It should be made clear that the MEK does 
not have any support within Iran where they are widely reviled, in 
part because of their support of Saddam in the Iran-Iraq War.  
As per the 2011 State Department report on the MEK, “the 
group's worldwide campaign against the Iranian government uses 
propaganda and terrorism to achieve its objectives.”69 This 
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includes a history of violence against U.S. citizens. Among these 
incidents are the 1972 bombing in the Tehran U.S. Information 
Service office, the 1973 assassination of the U.S. Military Mission 
chief, the 1976 assassination of two U.S. Military Assistance 
Advisory Group members and two U.S. citizens in Tehran.70 While 
the MEK denies its involvement, the U.S. State Department 
determined that, “MEK members participated in and supported the 
1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and that the MEK 
later argued against the early release of the American hostages. 
The MEK also provided personnel to guard and defend the site of 
the U.S. Embassy in Tehran following the takeover of the 
Embassy.”71 These are among the cited reasons for the original 
FTO designation of the MEK in 1997.72  
Prior to the delisting in 2012, the MEK and the United 
States have had a convoluted relationship. In 2003, Saddam’s 
sheltering and support of the MEK, the sponsoring of a designated 
terrorist group, was cited among the motivations for the invasion 
of Iraq. Interestingly, in 2004, one year after the occupation of 
Iraq, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld extended 
protected persons status under the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
thereby allowing for the U.S. to aid the group while it remained a 
designated FTO.73 In 2002, the NCRI, the political front of the 
MEK, held a press conference in which it revealed the alleged 
existence of two secret nuclear sites, as well as a laptop containing 
information on a secret Iranian nuclear arms facility that was given 
to the organization by a former nuclear scientist. These claims 
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Then, in 2012, it was revealed by Seymour Hersh that the United 
States had been providing training to the MEK at a site in Nevada 
from 2004 to approximately 2007.75 This revelation demonstrates 
the U.S. violating its own sanctions placed on entities listed on the 
FTO which stipulates that it is illegal to aid or support a designated 
organization. This training also potentially implicates the United 
States in the assassinations of five Iranian nuclear scientists which 
took place between 2007 and 2012, which have been strongly 
linked to the MEK in cooperation with the Israeli secret service, 
Mossad.76  Finally, in 2009, Iraq required that the MEK leave the 
country and take up residence elsewhere or repatriate to Iran. The 
United States then aided the group in resettling in Albania where 
they are based currently. Throughout this period, United States 
policy makers and politicians received money from the MEK in 
exchange for speaking engagements including John Bolton, who 
would later be instrumental in the U.S. leaving the JCPOA. 
A U.S. Treasury Department investigation in 2012 found 
that prominent U.S. officials had been receiving monetary 
compensation for speaking engagements made on behalf of the 
MEK. Among those who have accepted payment are former 
Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell, ex-FBI Director Louis Freeh, 
former Vermont Governor Howard Dean, former New York City 
Mayor and personal lawyer to President Trump, Rudy Giuliani, 
and former United Nations Ambassador and National Security 
advisor John Bolton.77 Similar paid speaking engagements have 
continued into 2018 with Giuliani and Bolton still among the 
speakers. During one of these rallies, in February 2018, John 
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Bolton declared to the gathering, “the declared policy of the United 
States should be the overthrow of the mullahs’ regime in 
Tehran…And that’s why, before 2019, we here will celebrate in 
Tehran!”78 The compensation for speaking at these MEK 
engagements, wherein promises of making regime change in Iran 
come true are central, ranges between $15,000-$30,000.79 
Although, now that the MEK are no longer a designated FTO, such 
an action is no longer in violation of the statutes that undergird it 
but considering the fact that the group still maintains an Iranian 
regime change goal and the official foreign policy towards the 
country is one of maximum pressure, the motivations surrounding 
the delisting should be examined.  
The decision to remove the MEK from the Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations list came in 2012, following an extensive 
lobbying effort from the group with U.S. supporters citing concern 
for the group’s safety as motivation for removal. Daniel Benjamin, 
former State Department counterterrorism director who worked 
closely on the delisting effort states “I supported the delisting for 
the simple reason that it was a humanitarian necessity. It was 
humanitarian to prevent them from getting slaughtered, and not 
because they had become a peaceful group, or the United States 
believed they were completely without a nefarious design. Would 
the MEK have been delisted absent the situation in Iraq? I don’t 
[think] there’s any question they would not have been.”80 The 
decision came under Hillary Clinton, then-acting Secretary of State 
under President Barack Obama. Among those who lobbied and 
supported the delisting were “R. James Woolsey and Porter J. 
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Goss, former C.I.A. directors; Louis J. Freeh, the former F.B.I. 
director; President George W. Bush’s homeland security 
secretary, Tom Ridge, and attorney general, Michael B. Mukasey; 
and President Obama’s first national security adviser, Gen. James 
L. Jones.”81  What is noteworthy about this list of individuals is 
that they are not representatives of humanitarian groups, nor have 
they been known to champion humanitarian causes. Therefore, 
suspicion regarding their lobbying in support of delisting the MEK 
for humanitarian reasons is arguably justified.  
 
 “…this is a game. This game needs to stop.”   
Having used Mohammad Javad Zarif’s quote as a starting point for 
examining the U.S. State Department Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations and state sponsors of terrorism list, what insight into 
the use of these lists have we learned? The U.S. State Department 
maintains the Foreign Terrorist Organizations and the state 
sponsors of terrorism lists for the stated purpose of identifying, 
maligning, and deterring terrorist activity. The legislation that 
undergirds these lists employ language that defines these activities 
while leaving room for interpretation based on national interests, 
allowing for the sitting administration to apply designations based 
on foreign policy interests. This results in the application of these 
lists to ostensibly vary from administration-to-administration and 
their corresponding foreign policy agendas. Additionally, there are 
instances in the history of these lists wherein a country or 
organization’s designation on or off the list is made irrespective of 
terrorism. Foreign policy motivations that are not concerned with 
managing terrorism include removal from the SST to enable 
support for a strategic ally as seen in the case of delisting. Also, 
these motivations can be seen in the listing and subsequent 
sanctioning of a revolutionary state not aligned with the United 
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States in the case of listing Iran. As well, the delisting to facilitate 
support for a cult-like group that has a history of killing U.S. 
citizens in the case of the MEK.  
Since the stated goal of these lists is to deter and prevent 
terrorist activity it is understandable for an observer to conclude 
that the motivation for the listing or delisting of a country or 
organization to one of these lists is grounded firmly in terrorism. 
What we have seen from the above examples is that there are more 
factors at work than the matter of terrorist actions and or support.82 
If it were the case that these lists were used strictly for monitoring 
and sanctioning as punishment for engaging in or supporting 
terrorism, then it could be concluded that designated countries and 
organizations pose a danger to the United States and the resulting 
sanctions placed on them are legitimate. Similarly, other countries 
who have demonstrated blatant support for terrorist groups would 
be included among the state sponsors list. Saudi Arabia presents a 
plain example of a country that should, by all accounts, be 
designated as a state sponsor. It was concluded in the 9/11 
Commission Report that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers 
responsible for the September 11 attacks on the World Trade 
Center and Pentagon were from Saudi Arabia. Additionally, 
Osama bin Laden, the once head of the al-Qaeda terrorist 
organization, was born in Saudi Arabia and maintained ties within 
the country. Indeed, the Saudi royal family has been found to have 
supported al-Qaeda and other linked groups.83 Yet, this 
 
82 The country of North Korea also provides another potential example of this. 
The country’s status on the SST was used essentially as a bargaining chip during 
the Six-Party Talks in 2008. After being delisted for nine years, North Korea 
was again designated in 2017 by what President Donald Trump described as a 
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development yielded no designation or application of sanctions and 
Saudi Arabia remains one of the largest buyers of U.S. weapons.  
The conclusion that is obvious from this study of the use 
and history of the U.S. State Department’s FTO and SST lists is 
that Zarif is correct in his description, this is indeed a game. As 
illustrated in the examples provided in this paper, this game is 
played not with safety and diplomacy in mind, but rather it is 
played to serve the interests of the United States, whatever they 
may be, under a given administration. And while this may be the 
case, it is unlikely for this game to stop, as these lists have proven 
to be useful foreign policy tools used to legitimate sanctions, the 
maligning of non-U.S. aligned nations, and support for groups and 
countries that uphold U.S. interests. As such, it is imperative for 
world citizens and observers of United States foreign policy to bear 
in mind these historical examples when countries, organizations, 
and individuals are placed on or removed from these lists as these 
determinations appear to be made more in line with foreign policy 
machinations rather than as a legitimate and consistent safeguard.  
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